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The electricity systems have a central role to play in the transition
towards a low carbon economy and integration of renewable energy
sources in the European Union. However, the European electricity
networks face a diverse set of existing and new risks that can hamper
the energy security of the member countries. This paper aims to
qualitatively and quantitatively assess these risks given the changing
operating framework of the industry characterised by market
liberalization and network interconnectedness in the EU. Within this
context, we primarily focus on the risks from exceptional events and
threats to the European electricity systems. A simple ex-ante risk
assessment matrix is proposed to gauge the network risks and take
prevention measures against them. Such assessment can be a useful
approach for policymakers and practitioners amidst the existing ex-post
reliability and quality of supply performance standards and indicators.
Our analysis suggests that economic risks pose the most serious and
challenging to the evolving European electricity system.
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1. Introduction

Electricity plays a vital role in the development of all economies because of its dual
role in the economy. It is an indispensable intermediate input factor in production
and a necessary final consumption good. Hence, the availability of electricity
supply at an uninterrupted manner matters and remains a major energy policy
goal of all economies. The economic, social, and political costs of electricity supply
disruptions or fluctuations can be entrenched with adverse macroeconomic
consequences. The adverse impacts arising from electricity supply fluctuations can
only be mitigated by ensuring a secure supply across the potentially competitive
segments (generation, retail) and the regulated natural monopoly segment
(transmission and distribution networks) in a reliable and affordable manner.
Past debates on security of supply (or energy security hereafter) have heavily
focussed on the availability of energy sources (Winzer, 2012; Jamasb and Pollitt,
2008). This implies that security of supply has traditionally come to be defined in
terms of fuel availability or network reliability. However, there are also emerging
concerns with regards to the security of the electrical systems (physical delivery of
energy sources) and the integrity of its operation (robustness, reliability and
resilience of networks) in the wake of several natural, accidental and human
conceived external threats and events (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). These external
events can be natural (such as natural calamities and severe weather conditions),
accidental (such as explosions and nuclear accidents) or human-engineered
malicious threats (such as terrorist attacks, sabotage and vandalism and
coordinated cyber-attacks,).
These natural, accidental and malicious threats can be termed as ‘low-frequency,
high-impact’ (LFHI) events. The LFHI events are characterised as having low
probability of occurrence but with the potential to cause significant and long-term
catastrophic damage to the bulk power system and the economy of many countries
(NERC, 2010)1. As such, the risks from exceptional events can transcend other
types of risks facing the electric sector due their magnitude of impact. For example,
the vulnerability of electricity networks from LFHI threats was vividly exposed
with widespread power outages or failures during the period 2002/03-2004/05

This is to say that the LFHI events, in general, have low likelihood of occurrence and high
magnitude of impacts although the measurements for each threat in terms of occurrence and
impact vary within each category of the threats being natural, accidental or human-tailored.
1
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across the UK, Italy, and North America (Bompard et al., 2011)2. In addition, the
economic damages due to Japanese power failures in March 2011 in Fukushima in
the wake of an earthquake and subsequent tsunami underscore the need for
protecting the electrical systems and grids based on a thorough ex-ante risk
assessment from inevitable natural calamities. However, the risks of damage from
severe weather conditions are not likely to decrease in the foreseeable future.
Long-term climate change and extreme weather conditions will continually
challenge and test the reliability, resiliency and robustness (the 3 R’s) of energy
infrastructure in many European countries.
Likewise, the risks of national or international malicious attacks are another wellperceived LFHI threat. An attack on the substations or transmission networks can
provide the possibility of engendering a major blackout and adversely impacting
the functioning of other inter-dependent critical infrastructures and networks such
as telecommunications, gas and waterworks. This is because electricity networks
power much of the infrastructures in advanced economies and thereby creates a
‘ripple effect’ of economic, social and environmental damage post-attacks (Douglas,
2005). While the existing grids are in the process of being digitalized and getting
‘smart’ for efficiency improvement reasons; it also invites a new and increased risk
of threat through isolated or coordinated ‘cyber attacks’ (Tritschler and Mackay,
2011).
The distribution networks stand rather vulnerable as they bear around 90 percent
of power failures while around 10 percent of power failures are caused by failures
in the transmission system (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). However, the rarity of
the occurrence of these events complicates the process of making any probabilistic
estimates in foreseeing the occurrence of likely threats and prepare against them
accordingly. There also exists limited operational experience in handling the risks
engendered by LFHI events while economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) may not be adequate to internalise their impacts in long-term risk
protection planning models.
Furthermore, the lack of clear conceptual frameworks concerning energy systems
security can act as obstacles in designing proper security measures against
external threats in energy networks. However, the aim of this paper is to identify
the potential risks and threat indicators faced by the electricity networks in the
light of on-going technological advancement and their existing energy policy goals.
Identifying the risks arising from various natural, accidental and malicious threats
2Hurricane

Katrina of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season was the costliest natural disaster that
completely halted the functioning of several critical infrastructures including the electricity
systems. It is also one of the five deadliest hurricanes, in the history of the United States. There
were at least 1,836 casualties in the hurricane and total property damage was estimated at
$81 billion (2005 USD) (Virginia, 2009).
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to the European electricity networks in the context of increasing market
liberalisation and integration through interconnectedness is a first step towards
protecting against them. This is especially relevant from a policymaking
perspective as the conventional literature on energy security has traditionally
focussed on the security of fuel supply in the generation segment with the
networks receiving little attention. This research aims to bridge such gap.
We proceed with the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 of the paper
analytically discusses the concept, conventional measures and existing indicators
of security of supply. Section 3 identifies a list of core set of security of supply
indicators concerning electricity networks. These indicators are further
quantitatively analysed and discussed in relation to some specific European
economies in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes.

2. Security of Supply: A Conceptual Overview

Security of supply (SES) is amply defined and used across the literature (Winzer,
2012). This is expected because energy security concerns many aspects that are
vital to all economies while it lacks a well-defined idea which involves more than
one scientific discipline (Loschel et al., 2010). The varying sources and nature of
risks coupled with the difficulties in assessing the severity, certainty and scope of
impacts can further blur and complicate the concepts and understanding of energy
security issues. As such, it has no widely agreed upon definition for two major
reasons. The primary reason is that security of energy supply is a multifaceted
issue with rather varied, interrelated and often complex notion involving the
diversity and difficult nature of the issues to be considered, and the requirement to
consider them in a holistic manner (Bazilian and O’Leary, 2006). Hence, defining
energy securities under stricter terms can become a complicated and controversial
task. Secondly, the definitions of SES are often broad and not well-targeted while
the security of the electricity system as a whole hinges upon the level of security
across each segment in electricity sector. The aim of this paper is to conceptually
address these concerns in understanding the security of supply in electricity
networks and help policy making accounting for the risks from external threats.
In general, security of supply is commonly implied as the continued availability of
energy relative to effective energy demand (Winzer, 2012). For example, the UK
Department of Energy and Climate Change focuses the definition of energy security
around the continuous availability of commodity supplies (DECC, 2009) while the
European Union(EU) definition extend this concept to include welfare aspects such
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as the impacts on the environment or the society in terms of sustainability
(European Commission, 2000). Thus, energy security encompasses addressing the
risks related to the scarcity and diversity of primary fuels (which is the
production/generation aspects) and the operational reliability of energy systems
(which includes the network aspects) to ensure that their services are delivered to
end users in an affordable manner (Blyth and Leferre, 2004). Hence, it is inevitable
that security of energy supply includes both issues of quantity, quality, and price of
energy. Likewise, the risks and threats associated with each segment are related
across the whole system while the integrity and operation of the system as a whole
improves by abating the level of risks across different segments. However, past
studies of energy security are primarily concerned with the physical availability
and delivery of fuel supply in generation. This implies the availability of energy
among the end consumers is unconditional upon the health of critical components
of the electricity supply industry (ESI) such as the transmission and distribution
networks.
Considerable emphasis is constantly placed on creating a diverse energy and
electricity system amidst the growing confusion on what actually should be
diversified (Grubb et al., 2006). It is generally believed that greater diversity
enhances the robustness of an electricity system to fossil fuel supply shocks
generating economic and security of supply benefits while also promoting network
resilience (Bazilian and Roque, 2008). However, the diversity of an electricity
system is wrongly interpreted both in qualitative and quantitative terms (Roques,
2003). Stirling (1994, 1998) argues that diversification is an investment allocation
technique in modern electricity systems where uncertainty and ignorance rather
than risk dominate the real electricity investment decisions.
As such, diversity can be understood from three necessary perspectives that
include variety, balance and disparity (the nature and degree to which the options
are different from each other) (Bazilian and Roques, 2008). Variety is the number
of diverse categories of ‘option’ into which a system may be allocated while
balance is a function of the allocation of the energy system across various
identified options (Stirling, 1994). Disparity refers to the manner and degree in
which energy options may be distinguished (Runnegar, 1987). Thus, ceteris
paribus, system diversity increases with greater variety of distinct types of energy
option; the more even the balance across energy options and the more disparate
the energy options. The understanding of diversity based on such threefold
classification places disparity at its heart while each of these property helps
constitute the other two (Stirling, 1998). Although each of these aspects is
necessary, they are insufficient properties of diversity. Table 1 shows that previous
studies have used varying aspects of the threefold classification in order to
understand diversity.
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Aspects of Diversity

Name/Reference

Variety
Balance
Variety/Balance

Category count (MacArthur, 1965)
Shannon evenness (Pielou, 1969)
Shannon-Wiener (Shannon and Weaver, 1962),
Herfindahl/Simpson (Simpson, 1949), Gini (1912),
Hill (1973)
Disparity
Weitzman (1992), Solow and Polasky (1994)
Variety/balance/disparity
Junge (1994), Awerbuch(2006), Stirling (2007)
Table 1: Aspects of diversity considered in prior studies
Source: Stirling (2008)

However, it is necessary to consider that diversity in itself is not a sufficient
criterion to guarantee the security of the whole system. As such, diversification of
energy sources is just one of the many security of supply strategies. It is important
that critical infrastructure such as that for long transmission networks are
continuously reviewed for properties of resilience in the face of several natural,
accidental and malicious threats (JESS, 2004). Nonetheless, in the face of
uncertainty and ignorance, an important insight to have emerged from a number of
sciences is that diversity provides resilience to systems exposed to such
incertitude (Grubb et al., 2006; Awerbuch, 2006). Alongside, it is important to
acknowledge that there exist more energy security strategies apart from
diversification even though diversification is often viewed as the dominant means
to energy security (JESS, 2006).
Another widely used approach in conceptualizing security of supply primarily
involves constructing indicators to assess the risks and associated costs in terms of
fuel imports dependence, political instability and resource estimates. This is
particularly important in the European context as energy imports and its
transportation (for example, natural gas) can originate from politically unstable
regions in the face of increasing energy demand. In addition, the creation of a
common internal market for electricity exerts extra importance on the crossborder flow of electricity across countries. This will require more economic and
political cooperation across economies along with an improvement in the overall
quality of electricity networks considering the growing demand for electricity.
De Jong et al. (2007) measure the short-term responsiveness to an energy crisis
with measures of security of internal energy supply and stability of the energy
transport system as a measure of security of external supply in their index. This
allows accounting for import risks which in reality is a component of overall
security of supply index. Le Coq and Paltseva (2009) incorporate the concepts of
risks and costs by constructing the risky external energy supply index (REES) and
the contribution to EU risk exposure index (CERE). Likewise, Roller et al. (2007)
6

construct a general energy security index by dividing the net energy imports on
the total energy consumption in which both the external energy supply and the
internal energy supply are taken into account. Turton and Barreto (2006)
incorporate the concept of long-term energy security by emphasizing the
importance of the availability of the domestic energy sources.
Similarly, Loschel et al. (2010) construct ex-ante and ex-post set of energy security
indicators by including the relevant risks and costs. Lesibrel (2004) and Bazilian
and Roques (2008) have argued that the mean variance port-folio theory (MVP)
can be applied to assess the trade-off between risks and costs in the generation
mixes or to the wider energy system. However, MVP is an optimisation tool rather
than an indicator for security of supply in itself. Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) suggest
market mechanisms as an efficient tool for allocation of resources and balancing of
supply and demand at times of scarcity.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has developed two set of indicators
incorporating the concepts of ‘resource concentration’ and ‘stresses’. The IEA price
component indicator shows the energy security implications of resource
concentration while the physical availability component indicator incorporates the
physical availability aspects of energy security. It is generally considered that the
indicators established by IEA are the most influential set of indicators in
measuring the security of energy supply (Loschel et al., 2010).
While these indicators primarily assess the SES in generation in terms ‘quantity
risks’ and ‘price risks’; the security of supply in the context of liberalized energy
networks is unaddressed. The liberalisation of energy markets across the
European Union and the subsequent energy policy objectives of creating an
affordable, sustainable and reliable energy supply have placed greater challenges
and pressures in the existing energy networks. The increase in international
electricity trade coupled with the transition towards a greener economy exacts for
considerable resources to be devoted in the design, maintenance and upgrade of
existing networks for a secure energy supply. Interconnections of networks
require extreme coordination among participating countries. The 6 blackouts that
occurred in 2003 within 6 weeks impacting upon 112 million people in the US, UK,
Denmark, Sweden and Italy demonstrate that increased cross-border trade of
electricity resulting from the liberalisation of the electricity supply industry was
not accounted for in the assessment of system security. Bailek (2004) states that
the 2003 blackouts in the Western countries were primarily transmission-related
and occurred due to the technical failure in the networks. These blackouts did not
occur from generation inadequacy or shortages of primary fuels. Hence, it is
generally believed that the frequency and scale of such blackouts is likely to
intensify in the current context of liberalisation and privatisation due to increased
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competition, scale of operation and cross-border trade of electricity (Thomas and
Hall, 2003; Yu and Pollitt, 2009). Table 2 summaries the major transmission
related blackouts that occurred in 2003 in terms of location, duration, population
affected, economic costs and interrupted energy.

Nature of
Blackouts
Date

North
America
August 14,
2003
USA and
Canada
50 million

England

Croatia

August 28,
2003
South
London
0.41million

January 12,
2003
Southern
Croatia
N/A

September
23, 2003
Sweden and
Denmark
4 million

September
28, 2003
Italy

2 days

30 minutes

N/A

8 hours

Economic
costs

4-10 billion
US dollars

N/A

N/A

Interrupted
energy

62000 MW

724 MW

0.002375
billion US
dollars
1270 MWh

18-24
hours
N/A

6550 MW

17 GWh

Location
Population
affected
Duration

Scandinavia

Italy

55 million

Table 2: Major blackouts in 2003
Source: Bompard et al. (2011)3

While the causes of the blackouts affecting the transmission networks vary; the
economic costs of security of supply interruptions are large. This justifies the need
for attention that modern electricity networks require in delivering a secure
supply of electricity. The case is especially true in Europe where it has become
evident that the European electricity market is characterized by underinvestment
in cross-border transmission capacity and by a reluctance to carry out costly
upgrades of power technologies which can improve the service quality (Yu and
Pollitt, 2009). These characteristics have coincided with the advent of
liberalisation, unbundling, of the sector, privatization and new centralized and
distributed energy technologies. However, changing climate and weather impacts
also remain a major risk facing the electricity networks which needs to be
accounted for in the evaluation of system security along with other threats
(natural, accidental and malicious) and events.
A common and accepted way of accounting for various threats and events in
evaluating the electricity system security is to assess the risks of security of supply.
The risks assessment can be qualitative or quantitative while the sources of risks
can be diverse. Qualitative risks can be quantified by assigning some clearly wellPlease note that the data for interrupted energy is available with inconsistent units as reported in
Table 2.
3
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defined values. However, the value that a certain risk takes can vary across
countries as the perception of risks arising from a particular thereat or
circumstances can vary significantly across them. We include four broad
classifications of risks in this study, namely i) economic risks, ii) technical risks, iii)
topographical risks, and iv) social risks facing the electricity networks. The
valuation of these risks in either qualitative or quantitative terms allows us to
construct a ‘security of supply’ indicator concerning the European electricity
networks.

3. Identification and Assessment of Network Risks

Energy security remains one of the topmost energy policy goals in the EU (see EU
Directive 2009/73/EC). However, the transition towards a low carbon economy,
the 2020 renewable targets and the need for cross-border interconnections in
achieving a common internal market for electricity imply that energy security
needs to be comprehended with these inter-related policy goals. The EU electricity
market currently comprises of 41 transmission system operators (TSO’s) from 34
countries covering about 300,000 km of transmission lines. Around 530 million
people are served by these transmission lines across Europe. Figure 1 shows the
map of high voltage transmission grid across Europe and the existing
interconnectedness among member states. However, regional integration of
wholesale electricity markets via increased interconnection, while promoting
security of supply, also exposes the system to the threats of ‘cascading failures’ that
can occur both within and among the interconnected networks.
The European electricity networks consist of a mixture of overhead lines and
underground cables of varying voltages and include various system points and
substations. The substations are responsible for voltage transformation and
include the switching and control equipment. However, the long distance (mainly
transmission) and short-distance (vastly distribution) electricity networks across
Europe face many risks and challenges with the advent of liberalisation, ambitious
climate change targets, increased distributed generation and digitalization of the
grid. Most importantly, the risks arising from natural calamities, adverse weather
conditions and social unrest cannot be over-looked. The risks to the existing
electricity networks can be classified as (i) economic risks, (ii) technical risks, (iii)
topographical risks and (iv) social risks depending upon the causes and sources
where they originate from. An enhanced understanding and assessment of these
risks is a useful ‘qualitative indicator’ to assess the system security which can
nonetheless be quantified somehow.

9

3.1 Economic risks
Electricity networks (both transmission and distribution) are traditionally
considered to be natural monopolies because their cost structure (high fixed costs
relative to operating costs) implies that it is more cost efficient that the market is
served by a single firm than many firms. Thus, they need to be regulated (Newbery,
1999). However, it is also the case that distribution networks while being regional
monopolies in physical terms often have a ‘market’ for distribution services and
activities (Saplacan, 2008). The networks being ‘natural monopolies’ are thus
subject to economic regulation in terms of price, entry and service quality across
Europe creating its own risks.

Figure 1: Map of European high voltage transmission grid
Source: Adapted from GENI (2011)
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i) Lack of adequate investments
It is observed that quality of service (Q0S) is correlated with the amount of
spending in general and investments in networks in particular (Joskow, 2008).
Thus, QoS is an integral indicator of overall security of supply in the networks.
Service quality in networks mainly involves two major aspects: continuity of
supply and power quality. Continuity of supply is measured in terms of number
and duration of planned and unplanned interruptions due to network failures. In
the face of decaying and old electricity networks across Europe, the lack of
investments can result in power losses, increase unplanned interruptions due to
system breakdown and increased episodes of planned outages also increase due to
frequent maintenance and upgrade. Power quality, on the other hand, requires the
maintenance of constant voltage in the absence of which significant costs can be
incurred due to damage to equipment.
The transformation from vertically integrated centralised electricity systems to
liberalised and competitive electricity markets have led to the issue of investment
inadequacy in electricity networks across Europe. The European Commission
estimated in 2007 that the realisation of the European energy policy targets will
require 750 billion euros to be invested in electricity infrastructure over the next
three decades (Skoczkowski, 2007). This will involve around 90 billion to be
invested in transmission networks and 300 billion in distribution networks.
However, the desired level of investments has not been achieved. The inadequacy of
investments in the electricity networks can be perceived as a regulatory ad policy failure
of the liberalized market structures across EU.
The lack of adequate investments in the networks implies that interconnection
capacity between European member states is insufficient and bottlenecks exist
within and between the countries in the fluid transmission of electricity. Likewise,
the prevention of the grid against extreme weather conditions and other external
threats coupled with the digitalization of the grid may require the adoption of
sophisticated technologies which involves additional investments.
In centralised energy systems, the optimisation of investments can be achieved by
coordination and command and control (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). However, this
is not the case among the European countries due to increasing liberalised and
decentralised structure of the regulated electricity markets. Thus, the role of
market design and regulatory framework can be crucial in addressing the
investment adequacy issues in liberalised European electricity markets. This is
discussed separately below.
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Role of regulation towards investments
Liberalisation of the electricity markets has been on the agenda in the power
sector of many European countries since 1990. Hence, the key features and
operating environment of the sector has been changing. The industry no longer
remains vertically integrated but rather unbundled (i.e. vertically separated) while
the nature of vertical separation varies across countries in functional, legal and
ownership terms. Competition has been introduced in the potentially competitive
segments while the natural monopolistic network segments, in the absence of
competition, remains economically regulated to mimic market mechanisms and
promote efficiency improvements (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007).
In particular, the primary goals of regulation in improving the security of supply in
liberalised electricity markets is to attract adequate and timely investments,
promote adequate maintenance and ensure efficient operation of existing network
facilities and create sufficient incentives for innovation and technological progress
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).The electricity networks across the European countries
are regulated by independent regulators. An independent regulator acts as the
custodian of public interests (Armstrong et al., 1992). The regulators decide the
amount of revenue to recover under regular time intervals (also called regulatory
lag). Historically, cost-based regulatory approach was used by many regulators to
regulate the network charges. It is argued that the cost-based regulation (also
commonly known as the rate of return (ROR) regulation) is efficient for generating
short-term investments but at the expense of long run efficiency. This is because
the rate-of-return regulation deviates from cost-minimization (also termed as the
Averch-Johnson effect) in the long-run (Averch and Johnson, 1962; Vogelsang,
2002). Likewise, the experience with price-based models suggests that price-based
regulation is effective for short-term cost reductions and efficiency improvements
but maybe less effective for long-term investments (Brunekreeft, 2009).
However, it is possible to encourage network investments with more marketbased mechanisms and incentives mechanisms such as merchant electricity
transmission networks (Joskow and Tirole, 2005). Such incentive laden pricebased regulation is popularly known as ‘incentive regulation’. The regulator has a
pivotal role in ensuring adequate network investments while not letting the prices
rise via the incentive regulation (Pollitt and Bialek, 2008). The network charges in
many EU countries are now subject to incentive-based regulation. The incentivebased schemes encourage the network utilities to undertake cost savings.
However, the striving for cost savings may result in lower service quality as
maintaining or improving upon a given level of quality of service is costly and
possible only at certain spending levels (see Ter-Martirosyan, 2003). A recent
study by Jamasb et al. (2012) suggest that while the incentive schemes established
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by the regulator to encourage utilities to reduce network energy losses leads to
improvement in sector performance, they do not provide utilities with sufficient
incentives to avoid power interruptions in the UK. However, the state of the
current European electricity network suggests that not only the size but the timing
of investments are crucial in ensuring a secure supply of electricity. The transition
to the smart grids, likely adoption of electric vehicles and the likely widespread
integration of distributed and renewable energy into the grid clearly heightens the
importance of the size and timing of investments and the role that the regulator
has to play.
In addition, it is also necessary that the appropriate incentives are incorporated in
the regulatory mechanism to create additional support for the grid to be protected
at times of extreme weather other external threats. The regulator faces a
challenging task of designing an appropriate mechanism to allocate the costs of
increased investments among different users in the regulated networks. As such
the role of regulator is likely to increase in the context of liberalised EU electricity
markets.

ii) Growth in electricity demand
Electricity demand is expected to increase in the European Union. It is estimated
that the demand for electricity will range within 3530 TWh to 3795 TWh by 2020
than 2856 TWh in 2008 (Ruska and Simila, 2011). Germany, France and the UK
were the largest electricity consuming countries in 2008 while combined
electricity consumption totalled 356 TWh in the Nordic electricity market area
comprising Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden. The transport sector is
expected to play a major role in driving up the electricity demand in Europe. It is
estimated that around 1.5 million electric cars (plug in hybrids and battery electric
vehicles) will be running on the European roads by 2020 (Rankin, 2010). Thus,
electric cars alone could increase the European electricity demand by 3% as
compared to the 2006 levels. The adoption of the electric vehicles on a large scale
can change the nature of the electricity demand as power demand can increase in
select hours of the year. This trend can increases the ratio of system peak loads to
average loads and falling capacity utilization leading to rising electricity costs. Such
trend will exacerbate the need to build new generation plants and transmission
lines in the face of rising average costs because of the need to pay for capital that is
idle most of the time (MIT, 2011). Similarly, the increased use of air-conditioning
(AC), computers and electric gadgets of varying shapes and sizes have catapulted
electricity demand in the face of growing capacity constraints in generation.
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The rising electricity demand is a major challenge and poses considerable risks to
the already congested European electricity grid. Grid congestion leads to a
deterioration in the quality of service due to frequent power outages. The ‘price
risks’ also remain as congestion can drive the electricity price higher at peak times.
In the light of market liberalisation, cross-border trade of electricity remains an
undisputed option to satiate and balance national electricity demand across the
European countries. Hence, whenever a large load is placed on the inter-connected
network, the adverse effects can spread along a large area. Voltage fluctuations can
occur as suppliers try to balance out demand or loads by reducing the voltage
across the networks (Hammond and Waldron, 2008).
One of the factors of past blackouts across Europe and North America in the early
2000 was primarily caused by network failures due to high demand pressure in
the grid. It is also likely that electricity demand will continue to rise for a
foreseeable future. In addition, a study by Eskeland and Mideksa (2010) show that
an increase in temperature has an impact on electricity consumption four times
the size of the equivalent decreases in temperature in Europe. Thus, electricity
consumption will be a crucial factor in the adaptation towards climate change
effects in the wake of future temperature changes.

3.2 Technical risks
Electricity is a non-storable product and requires the real-time balancing of
demand and supply at all times. Electricity networks also need to accommodate a
range of technologies such as distributed generation, electric vehicles, etc. and fuel.
Hence, technological aspects remain central to the effective functioning of the
network and hence the effective supply of electricity. In the light of technological
developments involving the electricity networks, different risks can arise from
such technological transitions as discussed below.

i) Distributed Generation
Significant economies of scale and reliability are the major advantages of
centralised electricity production. However, such system is also prone to
environmental and security of supply issues justifying the adoption of distributed
generation (DG). DG is predominantly site-specific in relation to energy resources
and demand. It refers to the energy supply close to the point of use by way of
‘distributed energy resources’ (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). DG is slowly
gaining pace across the EU member states as the liberalization of energy markets
has created environment conducive for its promotion. One of the features of DG is
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the flexibility that allows consumers to respond to changing market conditions
because of their small size and shorter lead times in construction as opposed to
centralised electricity systems. Devising and deploying mechanisms to provide
incentives for investment in flexible generation and for operating flexibly within
the system will become increasingly important as the penetrations of DG sources
increase across the EU countries (MIT, 2011).
However, the adoption of DG to a wider network can pose certain risks to the
existing distribution networks. This is because the existing networks are not
designed for decentralized supply and thus can be technically challenging. High
penetration of DG has the capability to complicate the design and the operation of
the existing distribution systems. A major shock or disturbance anywhere in the
network can instantly affect the power quality throughout the network and hence
requires careful monitoring to keep it stable. DG connections are also likely to
affect the system frequency. The absence of load-frequency control equipment
implies that DG operators are likely to rely on the transmission network operator
or the regulatory body to maintain system frequency. This can be risky and
thereby the connection of DG to the network in the absence of suitable back-up
arrangements needs to be cautiously assessed against such technical challenges.
ii) Diverse Generation Technologies
Mitigating adverse impacts of climate change and improving the security of supply
in generation require a significant switch towards low carbon energy sources in
Europe. This has led to an increase in adoption of renewable energy generation
across the EU member states. The EU countries in 2007 decided to meet 20% of
the overall EU generation from renewable sources. Diversification of energy
sources also adds to network resilience (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). However,
major changes to the electricity network are needed to meet the European
renewable targets while maintaining high service standards and reliability. This is
because the growing use of renewable poses three major challenges across the EU
involving i) the need to connect many new generators to the grids, ii) the need to
upgrade the system to deal with intermittent electricity supply and iii) the need to
connect small generating plants to the distribution network rather than the
transmission grid (Hammond and Winnett, 2006).
The interruption in the supply of renewable energy sources can affect the stability
and harmonics of the whole system in terms of fluctuating frequency and voltage.
Hence, it can affect the way the electricity system operates with twin major
impacts on balancing costs and the reliability costs. The balancing impacts relate to
the rapid short-term adjustments needed in order to manage the variability in
energy supply (energy fluctuations) over the time period. This can only be
achieved in the presence of a flexible grid affecting the operation and economics of
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electricity networks. In addition, the threats and risks resulting from the absence
of needed changes in power system planning and risk management, distribution
and transmission related planning, operations planning and interface between grid
and diverse generation techniques cannot be undermined in the face of growing
integration of diverse generation technologies in the grid (PSERC, 2010).
The reliability aspect relates to the extent to which generation will be available to
meet peak demands. In the absence of adequate supply, the TSOs are obliged to
ration the demand creating additional stress to the grid. Most importantly, the
integration of renewables to the grid takes place with the help of power electronics
converters that integrate the renewable sources to the grid in compliance with
power quality standards. However, high frequency switching of inverters can inject
major harmonics to the system creating severe power quality problems if not
implemented properly (Khadem et al., 2010). Hence, efficiently increasing the
penetration of grid-scale and diverse renewable generation while maintaining
reliability require modifications to existing European power system design and
operation. In addition, processes for planning transmission system expansion,
allocating facility costs, and, particularly, siting cross-border transmission facilities
will need to be reformed as interconnectedness increases in the EU (MIT, 2011).
While diversified generation technologies sources can add to network resiliency if
connected to the grid, it can generate several security of supply risks in the
absence of properly designed electricity networks to accommodate them in the
face of growing intermittency of electricity supply. However, it can be expected
that the adoption of smart grid will enable a larger integration of renewable
sources and distributed generation across the European electricity systems.
iii) Smart Grid Technology
Electricity networks across Europe are facing a major transformation as the need
to integrate more renewable energy, improve energy efficiency and allow more
consumer control over their energy consumption increases. The ‘smart grid
technologies’ is expected to deliver these goals as smart grid planning is relatively
at an advanced stage in Europe. The smart grid is expected to deliver three major
benefits namely (i) facilitating the transition towards a greener economy with
significant use of renewable energy, (ii) by creating an efficient grid that increases
the surplus of the consumers through greater energy efficiency, and (iii) enabling
technological innovation that creates jobs of the future and new opportunities
(Chopra et al., 2011).
According to the European Network of Transmission system Operators (ENTSO-E),
“smart grid” is the process “to transform the functionality of the present electricity
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transmission and distribution grids so that they are able to provide a user-oriented
service, enabling the achievement of the energy policy targets (2020 and beyond)
and guaranteeing, in an electricity market environment, high security, quality and
economic efficiency of electricity supply”. Thus, smartness is not an objective in
itself but rather a set of tools for achieving the 20/20/20 targets (Chaniotis, 2011).
Nonetheless, the smart grid will create a power network that is more reliable,
flexible, secure and efficient using smart devices and automation technologies.
However, the realisation of smart grid will require major investments in new
technology and spending in research and development (R&D). This implies that the
technology is fully prone to suffer from the economic risks of underinvestment.
The increasing price of rare metals which form a critical component for a variety of
smart-grid technologies because of a very limited global supply can deter the
widespread adoption of those technologies across Europe and the US. As many
new devices get connected to the grid, it also increases the threat surface with
every new connection. As smart grid comes online, the increased risks of cyberattacks will be among the main risk and challenge that the technology will face.
This is because the technical threats related to cyber security such as malware,
sensible information theft; traffic injection, etc. imply vulnerabilities of
communication and information systems that are capable of shutting down the
large areas of power generation plants in Europe (ENISA, 2012). Hence, there is a
strong dependency between smart grid security and security of supply in the
European electricity networks (Tritschler and Mackay, 2011).
While the future of the grid looks certainly smart, the risks and new challenges
faced by these electricity networks to overcome will also become apparent. The
cyber security risks and challenges associated with smart grid will require
additional focus on data and information security requirements, large number of
smart devices, legacy and secure communication protocols, synergies with other
critical infrastructures such as utilities etc. implying several smart grid security
challenges (ENISA, 2012). Moreover, it can be expected that smart grids can
facilitate the transition towards a sustainable and secure electricity supply in
Europe by overcoming the infrastructural and operational challenges evolving the
European electricity system.
3.3 Topographical risks
Topographical risks are those risks arising mostly due to the general location of
the place and too little can be done towards their mitigation. For example, Italy is
among the most seismically active countries in Europe as it lies directly above the
Eurasian and African fault lines where the two tectonic plates meet. Factors such
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as severe weather conditions and natural calamities also fall into this category.
Table A in the Appendix reports that 1.1% of outages in the US are weather related
while lightning also contributed to a mere 1.1% of outages. However, the main
approach to mitigate the economic impacts from such risks in times of occurrence
is by adapting to them through suitable prevention measures.
Weather remains a major challenge for the European electricity networks and the
problem is likely to aggravate considering the growing climate change concerns.
Immediate effects can be observed in terms of increases in temperature and
precipitation with predicted increases in sea level rise and storm surge. For
example, electricity transformers face new type of risks as temperature thresholds
will be surpassed. More often, temperature rises can result in increased sag of
transmission lines, increase in the number of underground fires and manhole
explosions fuelling the outage frequency, extent (customers lost) and duration
(Zimmerman and Faris, 2010). Long term changes in annual precipitation can also
lead to the corroding of the network equipment. Likewise, increased rainfall can
pose a significant threat to the substations and may also damage the underground
cable systems. For example, it is reported that the power outage that occurred in
the UK during 2007 affecting Yorkshire and Gloucester arose due to substation
flooding when high water levels reached critical paths at some substations (ENA,
2011). Thus, in the wake of evolving climate change concerns, the EU electricity
networks are required to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change.
Furthermore, the growth of weather dependent renewable and distributed
electricity generation in the future will place major challenges across the EU
electricity networks.
Overhead power lines are also particularly susceptible to severe weather
conditions such as wind storms and lightning. The 2003 Italian blackout was
caused by the severe weather storms that damaged the power lines from Italy to
Switzerland (ENEL, 2011). Similarly, the vulnerability of the European power
networks was also exposed when Scotland was affected by strong winds in the
name of hurricane ‘Bawbag’ on December 5, 2011. The hurricane blasted several
wind turbines and brought down several overhead power lines with 400 separate
incidents disrupting the electricity network across Scotland. It is estimated that the
economic losses from the power disruption amounted to about 100 million pounds
(BBC, 2011).
Securing the infrastructures such as electricity networks against severe weather
can be challenging. This is because it is difficult to make a probabilistic estimate on
the likelihood of occurrence of these events as most of these events occur rarely.
However, events such as extreme weather (high speed storms, heavy snowfalls,
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etc.) and floods may be easy to predict using complex meteorological forecast as
exists in many European countries. Adoption and innovation of sophisticated
technologies can be crucial towards safeguarding the grids against external
threats. For example, automated hydraulic wind power plants can be in windy
areas like Scotland such that the plant responds to the speed of the wind by
varying its height. However, this may require additional spending but also in
research and development (R&D). Inadequate investments in-itself remains a
larger economic risk facing the EU electricity networks aspiring to be modernized.
The regulatory practice and regime will prove to be a significant factor to shape
the future of European grids against several challenges in the light of investments
inadequacy in electricity networks.
3.4 Social risks
A social risk refers to those risks arising from unstable societal conditions. It
includes aspects such as terrorist attacks (including cyber-attack), civil war and
political instability. These events can largely affect the critical infrastructures of
the nation such as electricity networks. This is because the critical infrastructures
can be a prime target of the disgruntled masses to vent their dissatisfaction. Most
importantly, certain equipment and components of the grid are crucial and
installing them can be costly due to high sunk costs involved and greater time
required. For example, high-voltage transformers are one of the unique assets in
the grid. It can happen that unique assets are targeted by angry mobs which are
very costly and can take one to two years to procure, build and install (POST,
2004).
Electricity powers much of the critical infrastructures of the industrialized nations
such as EU from telecommunications to waterworks (Douglas, 2005). Hence, an
attack on the networks can halt the functioning of major infrastructures such as
transportation, communication, hospitals etc. However, the networks can also face
the risk of domestic terrorism apart from or including international terrorism. Civil
war and political unrest often become targeted and vandalised at times of these
events although it happens quite rarely in Europe. Such acts of terrorism bear the
potential of only causing short-term blackouts. It is proposed that decentralized
generation can ensure increased security of the grid over a rather long-term
implementation period because any single attack on the grid would have a lesser
impact on the grid as a whole when a major proportion of distributed generation
are installed (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Nonetheless, the threats of
international and domestic terrorism vary across countries.
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The adoption of the smart grid implies that the growth of data flowing through the
electricity grids is likely to exceed the growth of electricity flowing through them
(in percentage terms) over the next two decades. In the future, the communication
networks will become highly interconnected along with high physical
interconnection of the EU electricity networks. Hence, the increasingly ICT reliant
future grids are likely to expose its own set of vulnerabilities that may not be
existent in today’s grid. Millions of new communicating electronic devices such as
automated meters to synchrophasors will introduce attack vectors (paths that
attackers can use to gain access to computer systems or other communicating
equipment) that increase the risk of intentional and accidental communications
disruptions (MIT, 2011).
The threats from non-physical attack such as ‘cyber attacks’ and hacking to the
grids is set to increase as the networks gets digitalized in the future. A successful
‘cyber-attack’ can allow the hackers to disable grid protective relays and gain
control over the parts of the network (Douglas, 2005). As such, cyber-attack on the
electric grid remains one of the serious short-term threats in the US today as
reported by the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). A recent study by
Galvin Energy Initiative (GEI) reports that most of the outages in the US that
occurred at the distribution levels were caused by the acts of the public
contributing to 1.2% of the total power outages (Rouse and Kelly, 2011). The
problem is certainly set to spread and aggravate across the EU in the future.
Table 3 shows a simple risk assessment matrix based on the different risk
dimensions identified in this paper. These risks can be assessed qualitatively using
an ordinal approach such as low, moderate or high. However, one may also take a
cardinal approach and quantify the risks accordingly. For example, low risks can
take a score from 1-3, moderate risks can take a score from 4-7 and high risks can
take a score from 8-10 in a scale of 1-10. For a single country case, the overall risk
score will be the sum of the risks valued across all dimensions divided by the
number of dimensions. Moreover, it is possible to assign weights to individual
dimensions and take the weighted average for cross-country comparisons. This is
necessary because the valuation and perception of the risks is different across
countries at a given time as these risks are largely country-specific. For example,
the threats to critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks are perceived to be
higher in the US than Luxembourg.
On the other hand, risks can also be classified as short-term or long-term. Shortterm risks engender short-term impacts while long-term risks produce lasting
shocks to the system. For example, threats to the networks from civil unrest and
political instability can short-term risks while threats from weather and natural
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calamities can be a continued long-term risk. As such, the old risks associated with
vertically integrated power systems are falling while new types of risks are
emerging in the wake of a more liberalised and interconnected EU electricity
markets.

Risks
Economic
Technical
Topographical
Social

Aspects
Inadequate investments,
demand factors
Distributed generation, new
technologies, smart grids
Weather, natural calamities

LOW

MODERATE

HIGH

Terrorism, political instability,
civil unrest
Table 3: Risk assessment matrix
Source: Own compilation

4. Existing Indicators and Measures of SES in the European
Electricity Networks
A secure supply of electricity can only be possible in the presence of a robust,
reliable and resilient grid. QoS is one of the important ex-post performance
indicators to currently assess the security of supply of electricity networks among
the EU member states. Quality of service encompasses three different quality
dimensions: (i) voltage quality, (ii) commercial quality, and (iii) reliability (CEER,
2008). Voltage quality includes a variety of interruptions to the power system as
already discussed above. Most of the network-related interruptions occur in the
medium voltage (MV) and low voltage (LV) distribution networks (Keller and
Franken, 2006). Commercial quality is associated with individual agreements
between the consumers and the distribution companies while reliability includes
network adequacy and security. Adequacy is the availability of sufficient network
capacity to guarantee a continuous supply for electricity to the consumers in the
longer run while security is the ability of the grid to withstand interruption (i.e.
resiliency) in supply under adequate network capacity.
The most common quality of service indicators to assess system reliability in
Europe across the distribution networks includes SAIFI, SAIDI and MAIFI. They are
defined and understood as below:
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SAIFI stands for System Average Interruption Frequency Index. It is
estimated by dividing the number of customer interruptions by total
number of customers served and thereby measuring the number of outages
experienced by users.
SAIDI stands for System Average Interruption Duration Index. It is obtained
by dividing the sum of long interruption duration (i.e. longer than 3
minutes) by the total number of customers. Hence, this measure is a proxy
for the average amount of time that customers are interrupted.
CAIDI stands for Customer Average Interruption Duration Index. It is
expressed in minutes per interruption and can also be obtained as the ratio
of SAIDI and SAIFI.

Other measures of reliability across the EU distribution networks include
Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI) which is conceptually
similar to SAIFI, Average System Interruption Duration Index (ASIDI), Average
System Interruption Frequency Index (ASIFI), Customer Average Interruption
frequency Index (CAIFI), TIEPI and NIEPI.4
Likewise, reliability of the transmission grid is mostly assessed through Energy
Not Supplied (ENS)5 and Average Interruption Time (AIT). ENS is the total amount
of energy that would have been supplied had there been no interruptions while
AIT is the measure for the amount of time the supply is interrupted. Other
indicators also include measures such as Average Interruption Frequency (AIF),
Average Interruption Duration (AID), System Average Restoration Index (SARI)
(see CEER, 2008). Table 4 shows the various reliability indicators used to assess
the performance of the grid in selected European countries.
Country

Index

France
SAIFI, ENS, AIT
Germany
SAIDI, SAIFI
Italy
SAIDI, SAIFI, ENS, AIT
Netherlands
SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI
Hungary
SAIDI, SAIFI
Luxembourg
SAIDI, SAIFI, ENS
UK
CI, CML
Denmark
SAIDI, SAIFI, ENS
Table 4: Network reliability indicators in selected EU countries
Source: CEER (2008)

4

In the UK, Customer Interruption (CI) is used instead of SAIFI which is calculated as 100*SAIFI.
Likewise, Customer Minuets Lost (CML) is a synonym for SAIDI in the UK.
5 ENS is a synonym for END in Lithuania.
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Table 5 reports the SAIFI and SAIDI reliability indicators for some European
countries and the US accounting for major events. In the US, each customer is likely
to encounter about more than 2 hours of interruption (on average) and is likely to
face about 1.5 interruptions. These numbers are comparably larger than its
European counterparts such as Denmark where each customer on average faces
about 24 minutes of interruption with the chances of 0.5 outages. Similarly, each
customer in Germany faces an average outage of 23 minutes as the country boasts
of having the most reliable power grid in Europe. The average number of outages
that a customer faces is highest in Spain and Italy (2.2 times). The length of
interruptions that each customer is likely to face is also the highest in Spain with
104 minutes on average. Likewise, UK also faces a lengthy interruption with each
customer likely to face about 90 minutes of outages on average.
Country

SAIDI (minutes)

SAIFI

USA
244
1.49
Austria
72
0.9
Denmark
24
0.5
France
62
1.0
Germany
23
0.5
Italy
58
2.2
Netherlands
33
0.3
Spain
104
2.2
UK
90
0.8
Table 5: Reliability performance with major events
Source: Rouse and Kelly (2011)

Thus, we can infer that the reliability performances across the European countries
are currently diverse and rather heterogeneous. The primary reason behind such
heterogeneity is that the causes of interruptions (or risks of outages) largely vary
across these countries. Weather can be a fundamental factor in countries like UK
(Scotland in particular) and Spain while other topographical factors such as
earthquakes can be influential in Italy which is prone to earthquakes. Most
importantly, aging electricity infrastructure remains a central problem in many EU
countries as the grid consists of aging power equipment, obsolete system layout,
outdated engineering and old cultural values leading to old planning, engineering
and operating of the system (Willis et al., 2001).
Thus, there exists a significant potential to improve the security of supply by
enhancing the reliability statistics of the transmission and distribution networks in
Europe. Figure A in the Appendix reports the time-series statistics on number of
unplanned interruptions per year for selected European countries. Finland
experienced more interruptions in 2001 where the number of interruptions is 3.5
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more than in 2000 and 2002. Likewise, the number of interruptions for Italy in
2003 is one more than the interruptions occurred in 2004.
‘Exceptional events’ is the synonym for ‘major events’ in Europe. It includes
exceptional weather conditions and other exceptional circumstances such as
accidents and natural calamities that can affect the continuity of supply for long
periods even if they occur rarely. Figure 2 is a time-series presentation of all
unplanned interruptions that occurred among several European countries over a
time period from 1997 to 2007 across the high voltage (HV), medium voltage (MV)
and low voltage (LV) networks accounting for ‘exceptional events’. It can be seen
that the blackout and load shedding of 2003 resulted in high minutes lost in Italy.
Severe autumn storms contributed to high value of minutes lost in Finland and
Hungary during 2001.

Figure 2: Unplanned Interruption including all events (minutes lost per year)
Source: CEER (2008)

In addition, severe storm conditions in the southern parts of Sweden resulted in
extremely long interruptions in Sweden during 2005. Excluding these exceptional
events would mean that the average minutes lost in the countries considered due
to unplanned interruption would range between 50 to 250 minutes per year as
shown by the figure below. Furthermore, it is clear that annual variation for the
number of interruptions is less than the annual variation for the minutes lost
among the European countries. Hence, it is deducible that extreme events result in
longer interruptions rather than more interruptions in the European context.
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The regulatory approach in accounting for ‘exceptional events’ tends to vary across
the European countries (CEER, 2008). In some, the concept does not exist as in
Czech Republic and Finland. The different types of exceptional events in practice
and their definition, the situations classified as exceptional events, whether
exceptional events are visible in the interruption statistics and whether they are
excluded from any compensation payment varies among the European countries.
Table 6 demonstrates the definition, classification and treatment of exceptional
events in selected European countries. In most countries, exceptional events do
not automatically qualify to receive compensation payments. Only the UK, Finland
and Norway have some provisions of making companies eligible to receive
compensation payments when exceptional events occur. Likewise, Slovenia, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg do not explicitly report the interruption statistics
due to exceptional events while Poland and Slovenia account for them in the
statistics since 2009.

Country
France

Designation
Exceptional
event

Finland

Force
Majeure

Italy

Exceptional
conditions
periods

United
Kingdom

Concept
simultaneous
interruption for
more than
100,000 end users

Jurisdiction,
National
Regulatory
Authority
DSO

Yes

Yes, but
interruptions
longer than
12 hours are
compensated
No

Yes

No

Regulator

Yes

No

NRA

Yes

Yes, only is
some
situations

TSO6 and DSO

Included in
interruption
statistics

The concept of
exceptional event
does not exist

Germany

Czech
Republic
Denmark

Yes

Eligible to
receive
compensatio
n payments
No

Who
classifies?

Exceptional
event
Exceptional
event

Natural disasters,
terrorist attacks
and war, legal and
official orders
Based on
statistical
exploration and
computational
algorithm by NRA
The concept does
not exist
Hurricanes and
floods
Weather and nonweather related

Table 6: Definition and Treatment of exceptional events in some EU countries
Source: Adapted from CEER (2008)
6

TSO stands for Transmission System Operator while DSO stands for Distribution System Operator.
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Similarly, the entities included under ‘exceptional events’ considerably vary across
the EU members. Countries like Romania, Poland, the Netherlands, Hungary,
Germany and Estonia explicitly include terrorist attacks and wars under
exceptional events while Denmark and Austria only include natural disasters such
as hurricanes and floods. For Sweden and Slovenia, the concepts of exceptional
events are rather vague and broad. Sweden defines exceptional event as ‘any
events outside DSO’s control’ while Slovenia only considers ‘more severe condition
than the network requirements’. Thus, it is lucid that the regulatory approach in
accounting for ‘exceptional events’ differ vastly between the European countries.
In addition, it would be of interest to establish whether those countries explicitly
regulating these events have performed better than the non-regulating ones.
Another set of ex-ante indicators to assess the performance of the transmission
and distribution networks is the fraction of energy generated that is lost during the
transmission and distribution process. Losses, in general, are measured as the
difference between energy generated and energy delivered to customers. Hence, it
does not include losses due to theft. However, theft is not considered to be
important in the U.S. as well as in the wealthy EU countries today due to strong
governance and (de)institutionalization towards theft. Moreover, in Europe losses
consume between 4 to 16% of the electricity generated while the differences
between the European countries in terms of average T&D losses are very high from
4.4% for Sweden to 16.1% for Romania (ERGEG, 2008). Most of the losses occur at
the distribution grids than the transmission grids in Europe.
Figure 3 shows the transmission and distribution (T&D) losses of electricity
including the US and selected EU nations as of 2008. The T&D loss remain high in
the UK and is in line with Canada as compared to its European counterparts like
Germany, Spain, France and Italy. This is mainly because of the relatively old grid
in the UK than other countries. A significant proportion of the existing UK grid was
constructed in the late 1950s and between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s
(POST, 2007). Grid assets typically have a design life of about 40 years which
implies that the UK grid have reached and surpassed their design lives. Older and
decaying electricity network infrastructure can lead to higher system failure rates
and losses implying increased maintenance and repair costs. It is expected that UK
network companies will need to spend more on assets replacements over the next
two decades to ensure an efficient management of the network (Hammond and
Waldron, 2008). Moreover, the impacts of old network infrastructure on network
losses are also high in other EU countries and remains to be adequately addressed.
Furthermore, the figure further suggests that there might be a weak correlation
between network losses and population density.
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The treatment of losses across the regulated transmission and distribution
network also explains the varying amount of losses in these countries. For
example, Finland has no regulatory incentives or incentive mechanism to address
losses while in France regulatory incentives only exists for theft at the distribution
level. Explicit regulation of losses ex-ante can improve the performance of the
grids by reducing network losses ex-post.

Figure 3: T&D losses among some advanced economies
Source: Adapted from MIT (2011)

The above discussed set of indicators provides important insights on the
performance of the electricity networks based on the quality of supply. However,
these are ex-post indicators and their analysis is only useful after network failure
and outages occur due to exceptional and normal events. In contrast, the primary
objective of the European Commission (EC) is to design such energy policy
measures that are conducive to minimizing the failures and power outages at a
first place. This requires ex-ante risk assessment of the networks and designing
appropriate prevention measures to counter these risks beforehand. In fact, such
ex-ante risk analysis can be the first step towards creating a reliable, robust and
resilient European grid. Hence, we apply the risk assessment matrix designed in
Section 3 to assess the various risks that the electricity network currently faces in
the UK and France as an example. Such matrix can be used to assess the network
risks on other European countries lurching towards greater market liberalization
and network interconnectedness.
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4.1 The UK Context
Economic risks to the networks are high in the UK due to lack of investment in new
grid infrastructure and growth and variation in loads causing power quality risks.
The topographical risks the UK network faces from severe weather conditions is
moderately high. Likewise, the technical risks to the networks due to the adoption
of new generation technologies and new technologies such as electric vehicles,
smart grids can be considered to be weakly moderate. However, these risks are
likely to increase in the future due to the wider adoption of new technologies and
increased production of electricity from renewable energy sources. Similarly, UK is
considered to face low network risks from terrorism and social riots currently. We
assign a value to these risks based on a subjective assessment. The quantification
of these risks is also supported by an earlier risk assessment study by Hammond
and Waldron (2008).
Risks
Economic
Technical
Topographical
Social

Aspects

LOW
(1-3)

MODERATE
(4-7)

inadequate investments,
demand factors
distributed generation,
new technologies
weather, natural
calamities
terrorism, political
3
instability, civil unrest
Table 7: Risk assessment score for UK

HIGH
(8-10)
9

4
7

Therefore, overall networks risks for UK = (9+4+7+3)/4 = 5.75
4.2 The French Context
The modernization of the electricity networks remains a priority in France. Hence,
the economic risks of under-investment are also high in France though not as high
as in the UK. This is because the UK has one of the oldest grid infrastructures in
Europe. Energy diversity is currently less of a concern in the French electricity
supply system as the country relies on nuclear energy implying the dominance of
one fuel, once technology and a small number of related designs (Bazilian and
Roques, 2008). In such regards, the system is secure and robust to external
political, technological and economic events although the system may be probe to
generic technical faults. Hence, technical risk is low in France. The topographical
risks from extreme weather can also be considered low in France. On the other
hand, the risks of terrorist attacks on electricity networks can be high in France
due to the heavy reliance on nuclear technology.
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Risks
Economic
Technical
Topographical
Social

Aspects

LOW
(1-3)

MODERATE
(4-7)

inadequate investments,
demand factors
distributed generation,
3
new technologies
weather, natural
3
calamities
terrorism, political
5
instability, civil unrest
Table 8: Risk assessment score for France

HIGH
(8-10)
8

Therefore, overall network risks in France = (8+3+3+5)/4= 3.8
Does this imply that the French networks are more secure (reliable, robust and
resilient) than the UK ones? The answer may be ‘yes’ considering the data on the
minute lost per year, the number of interruptions and the T&D losses. Our network
risks score also support the claim. However, a cross-country comparison becomes
more authentic by reflecting country-specific characteristics into account. This can
be done by ranking the country specific risks and assigning the weight accordingly
in our case. Assuming that the first ranked risk is weighted 4, the second 3, the
third 2 and last one 1, we obtain the following scores:
Weighted overall network risks for UK:
{(4*9) + (3*7) + (2*4) + (1*3)}/ (4+3+2+1) = 6.8
Likewise, weighted overall network risks for France:
{(4*8) + (3*5) + (2*5) + (1*5)}/ (4+3+2+1) = 6.2
The weighted score suggests that the French networks are relatively more secured
than the UK networks by a small margin. Such an ex-ante risk assessment
methodology can be an important starting point for policymakers in the face of
uncertainty and scarcity of tools to assess security in networks. However, ex-ante
risk assessment tends to rely on the availability of information while the survey
methods can be costly as well. The accuracy of results is not guaranteed as some
bias may exist. On the other hand, ex-post network security assessment (such as
blackouts) can produce reasonable results with reasonable informational
requirement. Nonetheless, the process can still be costly. It is also necessary that
risk assessment should be done on a timely basis as risks are generally transient as
market and conditions evolves. The risks tend to appear, disappear and reappear
due to changes in market condition, technological developments and political
environment as in the European context.
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5. Conclusions
The quest for reliable, robust and resilient electricity networks remains a priority
among the European Union members. The European networks are facing new risks
in the face of rapid market liberalisation and growing market interconnections. As
such, the paper does not consider market liberalisation and interconnections as
sources of risk but rather a default conditions that the industry was destined to
emerge through. The new risks are classified under economic risks, technical risks,
topographical risks and social risks thereby allowing us to account for exceptional
events in the European context. It also suggests that factors exogenous to the
sector are creating new risks to the sector post 1990. We qualitatively and
quantitatively analyse these risks using an ex-ante risk assessment methodology.
Our analysis suggests that economic risks of under-investment and rising
electricity demand are one of the biggest risks facing the European electricity
networks along with the risks of natural calamities and severe weather conditions.
The transition towards smart grids and increasing digitalization of the grid imply
new cyber security threats facing the European electricity networks. The
protection of the networks against exceptional events and threats will require the
adoption of sophisticated technologies and system design and planning which does
not exist in many European grids. The obsolete system layout of power plants
under centralised structures will require additional substation sites while the
existing traditional tools of power delivery planning and engineering may not be
effective in current problems of aged equipment, and modern deregulated loading
levels. The high penetration of renewables in the grid will require detailed system
planning coupled with accurate resource and load forecasting across Europe in the
transition towards a low carbon economy.
Hence, the planning, engineering and operating system using concepts and
methodologies that worked under vertically integrated market structure cannot be
suitable under a deregulated and liberalised industry structure when most of the
electricity networks remain vertically unbundled from the potentially competitive
segments. More emphasis should be placed towards energy efficiency to manage
the growing economic risks of increasing electricity demand in the European
electricity markets. Our study also shows that an ex-ante risk assessment
technique that takes country-specific risks into account can be a useful risk
assessment tool to policymakers considering the uncertainty and paucity of risk
assessment tools.
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As electricity networks in Europe remain regulated natural monopolies, it is
evident that the system relies on the regulatory framework in place to embrace the
new risks from natural, accidental and malicious threats in the mechanism design
and to stimulate innovation in power systems and electricity markets. Preventing
against the risks arising from the integration of the different innovations such as
smart grids, smart metering, electro mobility and storage is likely to be the hardest
challenge for European regulators in the next future. Nonetheless, the coordination
among network regulators of the EU countries is essential to prevent against the
exceptional threats as these regulatory regimes have different priorities and focus.
Hence, the future of the risks and threats facing the European electricity networks
is vastly linked to the future of the network regulation in Europe.
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Appendix:
Causes of outages
Major events

Impact
Percentage
80.6%

Trees

5.6%

Distribution equipment failures

4.0%

Other

2.6%

Planned interruptions

1.3%

Acts of public

1.2%

Weather related

1.1%

Transmission outages

1.1%

Lightning

1.1%

Substation outages

0.9%

Animals

0.5%

Generation Outages

0.0%

Table A: Causes and percentage of outages in the US
Source: Adapted from (Rouse and Kelly, 2011)

Figure A: Number of unplanned Interruption including all events
(interruptions per year)
Source: Adapted from CEER (2008)

38

